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Abstract 
Our paper is a further contribution to the still very small empirical literature on the 
effects of competition on managerial incentive schemes. Based on a theoretical 
model that incorporates both strategic interaction between firms and a principal 
agent relationship, we investigate the relationships between product market 
competition, incentive schemes and firm valuation in a multivariate OLS 
framework. To take into account a possible endogeneity of the incentives provided 
to managers and Tobin’s Q, our measure of firm value, we additionally employ a 
simultaneous equations framework. The sample comprises 156 Swiss firms for the 
year 2002, and the compensation data refer to the firms’ top management and the 
board of directors in total. Our results suggest that more intensive product market 
competition is associated with stronger incentive schemes for managers and a 
lower firm value.   
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1. Introduction 
What are the effects of product market competition on managerial incentives? Do managers 
work harder when the firm’s environment is more competitive, i.e. do competition and 
incentive schemes substitute each other? And what are the impacts on firm value? While these 
and related questions are at the heart of an ongoing debate about corporate governance issues, 
the underlying mechanisms are only partly understood, and there is a serious lack of empirical 
evidence on these issues. 
The effects of competition on incentive schemes and firm valuation are not only interesting 
from a purely academic point of view. These issues are also highly relevant for public policy 
makers. During the last decade, there has been an increasing influence of governments and 
non-governmental organizations on corporate governance rules.1 As Khemani and Leechor 
(2001) outline, much of the attention has focused on the firms and the regulations that protect 
shareholder rights and govern the conduct of management. However, the environment in 
which business is conducted, such as the degree of competition among firms, entry and exit 
rules, and the openness of the economy, requires close consideration. Competition is needed 
for a culture of good corporate governance to thrive. Competition policy helps to increase 
efficiency, reduce price distortions, lower the risk of poor investment decisions, promote 
greater accountability and transparency in business decisions, and lead to better corporate 
governance.  Consequently, the design of effective corporate governance rules necessarily has 
to take into account the competitiveness of markets. While questions about the role of public 
policy are clearly beyond the scope of our paper, we should keep in mind that there may exist 
important interaction effects between competition and corporate governance rules. 
The theoretical literature on the links between product market competition and managerial 
incentives can basically be divided into two main strands. A first strand analyzes the effects of 
product market competition on managerial incentives, but compensation contracts are not 
allowed to affect competition. While the earlier literature informally argues that competition 
reduces managerial slack (e.g., Machlup, 1967), Hart (1983) is the first to formalize this idea 
by modeling the effect of competition on the agency problems between a firm’s owner and a 
manager. Subsequent research shows, however, that the relationship between competition and 
managers’ effort level is ambiguous (e.g., Scharfstein, 1988; Hermalin, 1992; and Graziano 
                                                 
1  The OECD is about to revise its Principles of Corporate Governance that were adopted in 1999. In the USA, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which reinforces the firms’ transparency requirements among others with respect to executive 
compensation, came into power in 2002. In Germany, the German Corporate Governance Code, a similar set of 
transparency rules that is however not compulsory, has recently been implemented by the German government. In 
Switzerland, the Swiss Code of Best Practice has become effective in 2002. The authorities of the European Union discuss 
the adoption of a corporate governance codex. See also Emons and Wanzenried (2003). 
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and Parigi, 1998).2 While these studies rely on the information effect of competition, which 
means that competition induced by many firms in the market may give more precision to 
incentives based on relative performance evaluation, Schmidt (1997) uses the idea that more 
competition increases the probability of firms going bankrupt. He shows that the effects of 
competition on managers’ effort level and the strength of their incentive schemes crucially 
depend on managers’ outside options. In particular, an increase in the product market 
competition is more likely to result in stronger incentives in case managers have good outside 
options. Raith (2003) examines how the degree of competition among firms in an industry 
with free entry and exit affects the incentives for their managers. Such a setup with free entry 
and exit implies that changes in the nature of competition lead to changes in the equilibrium 
market structure. His results suggest an unambiguous positive relationship between 
competition and incentives. The second strand of the theoretical literature on competition and 
incentives is based on the idea that precommitment to managerial incentive contracts can alter 
the strategic competition between rivals.3 Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) extend the literature 
by considering compensation contracts based on relative performance evaluation.4   
The empirical papers that relate product market competition to compensation are not very 
numerous and are mostly in line with Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), Kedia (2003) and Joh 
(1999). These studies explicitly take into account strategic interactions and the structure of 
product markets to explain managerial compensation contracts. In particular, they use these 
aspects to address the relative performance evaluation puzzle, which is the fact that empirical 
studies do not seem to find any role for relative performance evaluation in incentive contracts. 
Another recent paper by Funk and Wanzenried (2003) provides some evidence for Schmidts 
(1997) hypothesis that the relationship between competition and strength of incentives 
depends on the managers’ outside options. Finally, Cuñat and Guadalupe (2004) study the 
impact of product market competition on the compensation packages in the US banking and 
financial industry. 
                                                 
2  Scharfstein (1988) reconsiders Hart’s model while relaxing the assumption of infinitely risk-adverse managers. Hermalin 
(1992) considers additional effects of competition on the agency problem, all of which are of potentially ambiguous sign. 
Therefore, he concludes that theory cannot offer a definitive answer to the question of whether competition reduces 
managerial slack. Graziano and Parigi (1998) analyze the relationship between product market competition and managerial 
effort in a linear principal agent model. While increasing competition stemming from a lower degree of product market 
differentiation reduces the manager’s optimal effort level and the optimal piece-rate, an increase in the number of firms has 
an ambiguous effect on effort and piece-rate.   
3  See, e.g., Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987), and Fumas (1992). 
4  They examine compensation contracts for managers in imperfectly competitive product markets and show that strategic 
interactions among firms can explain the lack of relative performance-based incentive schemes for which compensation 
decreases with rival firm performance. They find that firms in more competitive industries place more weight on rival firm 
performance relative to own firm performance. Their study is one of the very few papers that empirically test the 
relationship between incentives and competition. 
 3 
There is very few empirical evidence on the relation between product market competition and 
firm value. Griffith (2001) argues on page 1 that the direction of the effect that product market 
competition should have on firm value is ambiguous: „On the one hand increasing 
competition lowers firm’s profits and thus reduces incentives to exert effort (the 
Schumpeterian effect), on the other hand it reduces agency costs (or increases the risk of 
bankruptcy) thus increasing incentives to exert effort.“ However, the empirical literature is 
mainly concerned with the effect of product market competition on productivity growth 
instead of firm value. For example, Nickel et al. (1997) find that product market competition 
has a positive impact on total factor productivity.5 Consistently, Januszewski et al. (2002) find 
for a sample of almost 500 German firms in the manufacturing industry that firms experience 
higher productivity growth when operating in markets with intense competition. Grosfeld and 
Tressel (2001) analyze the impact of competition and corporate governance on firm 
performance for firms listed on the Warsaw Stock exchange. They find that product market 
competition and good governance tend to reinforce each other.6 One exception is Habib and 
Ljungqvist (2004) investigating the effect of product market competition, as measured by a 
Herfindahl index based on four-digit SIC codes, on firm value. They provide evidence that 
firm value is positively related to product market competition. 
The aim of our paper is to contribute to the still very small empirical literature on the 
relationship between product market competition and managerial incentives. Based on a 
theoretical model that incorporates both strategic interaction between firms and a principal 
agent relationship, we use a multivariate OLS framework to empirically investigate the 
relationships between product market competition, incentive schemes, and firm valuation for 
Swiss companies.  
We consider a principal-agent model in a Cournot oligopoly setup. Such a setup not only 
takes into account the classical moral hazard problem within the firm, which is induced by the 
unobservability of the manager’s effort, but it also incorporates strategic interaction between 
the firms. The model is structured as follows: At stage one, the firm owner hires a manager 
whose task is to reduce the firm’s costs. At stage two, the manager decides on his 
unobservable effort level. At the last stage, finally, the firms compete with each other on 
output markets. The theoretical predictions of the model are threefold. First, the relationship 
between the strength of the incentive scheme and the intensity of competition depends on the 
                                                 
5  See, e.g., Nickell et al. (1997) for a summary of empirical evidence on the effect of product market competition on 
productivity performance.  
6  See, e.g., Carlin and Horvath (2000) for a summary of empirical evidence on the impact of competition on firm 
performance in transition economies.  
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absolute level of competition. For low levels of competition, more competition leads to 
weaker incentives. For higher levels of competition, however, a higher intensity of 
competition results in stronger incentives. Second, the relationship between the intensity of 
competition and the strength of the incentive schemes increases in the level of competition. 
Third, the effect of competition on firm value is negative, meaning that firms in more 
competitive environments realize lower profits.  
Our data comprises information about firm characteristics and top management’s and board of 
directors’ compensation of 156 firms quoted at the Swiss Exchange (SWX) for the year 2002. 
In addition, we use three different variables for measuring the intensity of competition on 
product markets, namely one firm-specific and two industry-specific measures. The firm-
specific measure is based on firms’ rents from production and other business activities. The 
two industry-specific competition measures are a sales-based Herfindahl index and an 
indicator that measures the intensity of regulations for entering a new industry. We use a 
multivariate OLS regression analysis to investigate the relationship between product market 
competition, managerial incentives and firm value. Based on Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) 
and Beiner et al. (2004), we additionally apply a simultaneous equations framework in order 
to take into account a potential endogeneity problem. 
The empirical results reveal that in general a more intense product market competition is 
associated with stronger incentive schemes for managers as measured by the fraction of share-
based to cash compensation. This result is consistent with the first hypothesis of our 
theoretical model and suggests that firms are operating in competitive environments on 
average. Moreover and consistent with our second hypothesis, we find the positive influence 
of competition on incentive schemes to be stronger for firms operating in a high competition 
environment. Finally and consistent with the third hypothesis of our theoretical model, we 
find a positive but not statistically significant effect on firm value for all three competition 
proxies indicating that a higher product market competition is associated with a lower firm 
value. Thus, the negative effect of lower economic rents seems to outweigh the positive effect 
of reducing managerial slack and increasing the managers’ effort by providing additional 
monitoring and increasing the threat of liquidation. 
The new aspects of our paper are the following ones: It is the first study that provides 
empirical evidence on the effects of competition on managerial incentives and firm valuation 
for Swiss companies. Furthermore, our empirical framework based on a simultaneous 
equations system suggests a way to deal with the potential endogeneity problem between 
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competition, incentives and firm valuation. Finally, our theoretical principal-agent model 
explicitly takes into account the strategic interactions between firms without relying on the 
information effect of competition and the relative performance evaluation. This feature of the 
model allows us to formulate our hypothesis in terms of observable variables, which makes it 
particularly attractive for empirical tests.  
The paper is structured as follows. The theoretical model and our main hypotheses are in 
section 2. Section 3 describes the data. The empirical analysis is in section 4, and section 5 
comprises some robustness tests. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Theoretical model and main hypotheses 
2.1. The setup 
The purpose of our model is to investigate the effect of product market competition on the 
incentive schemes for managers and the value of the firm when there are strategic interactions 
between the market players.7 We consider a principal-agent model within a Cournot oligopoly 
setup, where the owner of the firm hires a manager to reduce marginal costs. In contrast to 
other work, our model neither relies on the information effect of competition, nor on relative 
performance evaluation, which both impose rather strong constraints in terms of observability 
of certain variables. The model has three stages. At stage one, the owner of firm i hires a 
manager who has to reduce the costs of the firm. At stage two, the manager provides effort 
that affects the firm’s marginal production cost. The manager’s effort decision is 
unobservable to the owner, who can only observe the cost reduction. At stage three, the owner 
decides on the output level, profits are realized and the manager gets paid. 
Each firm i has constant marginal costs given by ( )i ic c e ui= − − , where c  is a constant,  
is the effort level exerted by the manager, and u  is a random term that is assumed to be 
normally distributed with zero mean, variance 
ie
i
2σ , and is independent of the other firms’ 
shocks. The manager’s effort level is not observable. The owner of the firm can only observe 
the realized costs c , which are also contractible. There are no fixed costs. The owner of the 
firm offers the manager a linear compensation scheme that is a function of the observed cost 
reduction, i.e., 
i
                                                 
7  Our model is similar to Raith (2003), who considers the effects of competition on incentives within a circular city model 
with an endogenous determination of market structure.   
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(i i i iw c )cα β= + −          (1) 
The parameter iα  denotes the fixed part of the salary, and iβ  is the piece rate that ties the 
manager’s wage to the performance of the company, and ( )ic c−  is the observed cost 
reduction. Given that the cost reduction affects the profitability of the firm, we can interpret 
iβ  also as pay-for-performance sensitivity.
8  
The utility of the manager is given by ( )[ ]{ }ii egwr −−− exp , where r, with r>0, is the 
manager’s degree of risk aversion, which we assume to be constant, and  is his 
disutility of exerting effort, with . The expected value of the manager’s wage is thus 
2( ) / 2i ig e ke=
1k >
i ieiα β+  with variance of 
2
i
2β σ . Given the normal distribution of , the utility of the 
manager can be written as in (2), i.e., 
iu
22
222
ii
iiii
kereU −−+= σββα        (2) 
The manager accepts any contract ( , )i iα β  that gives him an expected utility of at least his 
reservation utility, which we normalize to zero.  
The inverse demand function of firm i is given by (3):   
 ( , ) , 1,..., ,  i i i i j jj  p q q a bq d q i j N i j− = − − = ≠∑     (3) 
where a, with  and 0a > a , is the size of the market, b is a positive constant, and qc> i is 
firm i’s output. The variable qj is the output of firm i’s rival j. The coefficient , with 
, captures the degree of product differentiation between the products on the market. 
The larger d , the closer substitutes the products are. The parameter d  is commonly used to 
measure the degree of competition in a market, where higher values imply a more intensive 
competition.
jd
0 jd< < b
j
j j
i9 To keep things simple, we set b=1 and ,i jd d d= = ∀ ≠ . We further assume 
that there are only two firms in the market. We are looking for the subgame perfect 
equilibrium of the game. Therefore, we solve the model by backwards induction. 
 
                                                 
8  See, e.g., Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Murphy (1999). 
9  See, e.g., Graziano and Parigi (1998). 
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2.2. The firm’s output decision 
At t=3, the firms simultaneously choose their output levels. The profit of firm i gross of 
managerial compensation is given by (4). 
2 ,1,        ,)()( =−−−=−= jiqcdqqaqcp iijiiiiπ     (4) 
  
From maximizing (4) with respect to  and solving for  we get the firms’ reaction 
function, i.e.,  
iq iq
( )
( ) , , 1, 2
2
i j
i j
a c dE q
q q i j
− −
= =       (5) 
If firm i’s rival is expected to set a quantity of , the resulting profit of firm i is as in (6). ( )jE q
2( ( ))
( , ( )) , , 1, 2           
2
i j
i i j
a c dE q
c E q i jπ
− − 
=  
 
=     (6) 
Simultaneously solving the system of two equations as given by (5) yields the equilibrium 
quantities of the third stage as a function of the firm’s own marginal costs  and the rival’s 
expected costs , i.e., 
ic
( )jE c
2 ,1 ,      ,
)4(
))(()(2
2
*** =
−
−−−
= ji
d
cEadca
q jii      (7) 
From substituting (7) into (3) we obtain the equilibrium price given by (8) and can compute 
the expected gross profits as given by (9): 
2
***
2
2( ) ( ( ))
, , 1,
(4 )
i j i
i
a c d a E c d c
p i
d
+ − − −
= =
−
2j
     (8) 
2 ,1 ,      ,
)4(
))(()(2 2
2
*** =





−
−−−
= ji
d
cEadca ji
iπ      (9) 
 
2.3. The manager’s effort decision 
At t=2, the manager of firm i chooses his effort level by maximizing his utility given in (2): 
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2 2 21max , 1, 2
2 2i i i i i i ie
kU e r e i jα β β σ= + − − =      (10) 
Differentiating (10) with respect to ei  yields the effort level as a function of the compensation 
parameter iβ , i.e.,   
( ) , 1, 2ii ie ik
jββ = =         (11) 
The individual rationality constraint (IRC) of the manager i is given by  
2 2 21 0 , 1,
2 2i i i i i
ke r e i jα β β σ+ − − ≥ = 2       (12) 
where the manager’s outside utility is normalized to zero. Assuming competitive labor 
markets, the (IRC) is binding, which also means that (12) holds with equality. This allows us 
to calculate the fixed salary component iα  the manager has to be paid in order to have a 
reservation utility of zero. 
2 2
** (1 )( ) , 1, 2
2
i
i i
kr i j
k
β σα β −= − =       (13) 
The manager’s wage as a function of iβ  is then given by 
2 2
** (1 )( ) ( ) , 1, 2
2
i
i i i i
krw c c
k
β σβ β−= − + − =i j      (14) 
 
2.4. The optimal incentive scheme 
At the first stage of the game at t=1, the owner of the firm chooses the incentive scheme for 
the manager. He maximizes his expected profit net of manager’s wage, which is given by (9) 
minus (14). Using ( )i ic c e ui− = + ,  ( ) /i i ie kβ β= ,  and  ( ) 0iE u = , the net expected profit is 
given by (15).  
2 ,1 ,    ,
2
)1(
)4(
))(())((2
)(
22
22
2
, =−
−
+
−



 −+−−
= ji
kk
kr
d
acEd
k
ca
i
i
i
j
i
iinet
ββσβ
β
βπ  (15) 
Differentiating (15) with respect to iβ  and solving for iβ  leads to  
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2 ,1 ,     ,
8)4)((
)))(()(2(4
2222i =−−+
−+−
= ji
drkk
acEdcak j
σ
β      (16) 
In a symmetric equilibrium, all firms choose the same piece rate β , and each manager 
chooses the same effort level . Accordingly, e kceccE j )( /β−=−= . Substituting this 
expression into (16) and solving for β  leads to (17), the optimal incentive parameter. 
 
4)842)((
)(4
2322
*
−++−−+
−
=
dddkrk
cak
σ
β       (17) 
To find the equilibrium quantity and profit net of managerial compensation, we plug (17) into 
the corresponding second-stage equilibrium values, which yields the following results: 
4)842)((
))(4)((
2322
222
*
−++−−+
−−+
=
dddkrk
cadkrkq
σ
σ       (18)
  
[ ]
[ ]
       
4)842)((
8)4)(())(1(
2 2322
222222
*
+−−++
−−+−+
=
dddkrk
dkrkkcakr
net
σ
σσπ
    (19) 
 
2.5.  The effects of competition on the strength of incentive schemes and firm 
value 
How does competition affect the optimal pay-for-performance sensitivity β* and firm value? 
Following Graziano and Parigi (1998), we use the degree of product differentiation d as a 
proxy for the intensity of competition. The larger d, the closer substitutes the products are, 
and the higher the intensity of competition. As to firm value, we look at the profit net of 
manager’s compensation. 
From differentiating the optimal pay-for-performance sensitivity as given by (17) with respect 
to competition measure d we obtain 
 [ ]2 2322
22*
4)842)((
)1)(23)(2)((4
+−−++
+−+−
=
∂
∂
dddkrk
krddcak
d σ
σβ      (20) 
To obtain the sign of this expression, we only need to look at the numerator since the 
denominator is always positive. Given that a c>  by assumption, this expression is positive 
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iff . It follows that the owner of the firm more closely ties the manager’s wage to the 
performance of the company once the intensity of product market competition has reached a 
certain level. This leads us to our first hypothesis. 
2 / 3d >
**
i
ic
π∂
∂
Hypothesis 1: A higher intensity of product market competition, as measured by the degree of 
product differentiation d, leads to stronger incentive schemes for the manager in case the 
intensity of product market competition has reached a certain level, i.e., 
*
0  
d
β∂
>
∂
 for d>2/3. 
Obviously, there are different effects at work. First, there is a business stealing effect: a higher 
value of d implies a more elastic demand, which makes it easier for a firm with a cost 
advantage to take away business from its rival. Accordingly, for a given quantity of its rival, a 
more intensive competition increases a firm’s marginal benefit of reducing its costs. Given 
this first effect, the firm wants to give stronger incentives to its manager with increasing 
competition, leading to lower marginal costs. However, there is a second effect at work that 
can be denoted as a scale effect: a higher value of d also leads to a fall in firm i’s output.10 
This decreases the firm’s gain from reducing its costs and leads the firm to give weaker 
incentives to the manager when competition is increasing. While the second effect, the scale 
effect, is dominating for lower values of d, the formerly described business stealing effect 
starts to dominate once the degree of competition has reached a certain level, i.e., for values 
of d>2/3. Accordingly, for lower values of d, the incentive parameter β  is decreasing when 
the intensity of competition is increasing; for higher values of d, in contrast, the incentive 
parameter β  is increasing in the intensity of competition parameter. In other words: For 
values of d>2/3, firms provide stronger managerial incentives because greater competition 
increases the value of making good decisions (i.e., the business stealing effect increases). 
To understand the underlying mechanisms from a formal point of view, we can look at firm 
i’s marginal gain of reducing its costs, i.e., let us differentiate (9) with respect to : ic
*
2 2
4 2( ) ( ( ))
( 2) ( 2)
ia c d a E c
d d
 − − −= −
− +
j 
                                                
      (21) 
In a symmetric equilibrium, expression (21) is clearly negative. This reflects the fact that the 
firm can increase its profit by lowering its costs. To see how the marginal profit of a cost 
reduction moves with the intensity of competition, which is really our main interest, we go 
 
10  This can best be seen by differentiating the equilibrium output level as given by (18) with respect to d, which is clearly 
negative. From an economic point of view, the willingness to pay for the product of firm i decreases with a higher value of 
d, i.e., the closer substitutes the products are. As we can see from firm i’s reaction function as given by (5), a higher value 
of d leads to a lower output for firm i. This is to compensate the fall in profits due to the lower price.  
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one step further and differentiate (21) with respect to the degree of product differentiation d 
that yields (22): 
***
2
3 3
4 (3 4)( ( ) ) 8 ( )
( 2) ( 2)
i
ji d E c a d a cc
d d d
π ∂
∂  
i + − + −∂  =
∂ − +
      (22) 
In a symmetric equilibrium expression (22) is positive for d<2/3, whereas (22) is negative for 
d>2/3. A positive sign of (22) means that the marginal profit of a cost reduction, which is a 
negative value, becomes less negative and thus smaller in absolute terms when d is increasing. 
This reflects the fact that the scale effect is dominating and the firm lowers the incentive 
parameter β  when the intensity of product market competition is increasing. The negative 
sign of expression (22) for d>2/3, in contrast, mirrors the dominance of the business stealing 
effect: The marginal profit of a cost reduction becomes larger in absolute terms with a higher 
intensity of competition d, and this induces the firm to give stronger incentives to its manager. 
To see how the relationship between the incentive parameter β  and d changes with different 
levels of competition, we go another step further and differentiate (20) with respect to d, i.e., 
[ ]
[ ]3 2322
432222
*
4)842)((
64)3816)(()1)((16
−++−−+
−−++++−
=
∂






∂
∂∂
dddkrk
dddkrkkrcak
d
d
σ
σσ
β
 (23) 
Expression (23) is positive, which also means that the marginal effect of competition on the 
incentive parameter becomes stronger with increasing competition. To see this, we only need 
to look at the square brackets in the numerator since all other expressions are positive. Within 
the square bracket, the product is always equal to or bigger than 16, since k is equal to or 
bigger than one and r is positive. Therefore, the considered expression in the square brackets 
is positive for all values of d (to remember: 10 ≤≤ d ). This expression becomes even larger 
with higher values of k. These considerations lead us to our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The marginal effect of competition on the incentive parameter β  increases with 
the intensity of product market competition, as measured by the degree of product 
differentiation d, i.e.,
*
( )
0d
d
β∂∂ ∂ >
∂
 for d∀ . 
As to the effect of competition on firm value, we differentiate the net profit as given by (19) 
with respect to d, which yields (24). 
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[ ]
[ ]3 2322
342222222*
4)842)((
88)16164)(()2()()1(2
−++−−+
+−−+−++−+
=
∂
∂
dddkrk
ddddkrkdcakkr
d
net
σ
σσπ
 (24) 
Expression (24) is clearly negative: From before, we know that the denominator is always 
positive. As to the numerator, we only need to look at the square brackets since all other 
expressions are positive. Within the square bracket, the product is always equal to or bigger 
than -16, since k is equal to or bigger than one and r is positive. Since  and -8d + 8 is 
equal or smaller than 8 for all values of d, the expression in the square bracket is always 
negative. These considerations lead us to our third hypothesis. 
1>k
Hypothesis 3: A higher intensity of product market competition, as measured by the degree of 
product differentiation d, leads to a lower net profit, i.e. 
*
0  net
d
π∂
<
∂
for d∀ . 
The explanation of this result is straightforward and stands in line with standard oligopoly 
models. The closer we move to perfect competition in terms of having more homogenous 
products, c.p., the lower the profits of the firms are.  
The hypotheses derived from our theoretical model are subject of our empirical tests in 
sections 4 and 5. 
 
3. Data and sample 
3.1. Definition of variables  
3.1.1. Product market competition 
In this section we provide a detailed description of the variables we use in our empirical 
analysis. Similar to Nickell (1996), Nickell et al. (1997) and Grosfeld and Tressel (2001), our 
standard measure of product market competition is a firm’s rents from production and other 
business activities, Rents, which can be interpreted as an ex-post measure of market power. 
The motivation for using this measure is that firms operating in less competitive markets 
should be able to sell their products well above marginal costs and, therefore, earn higher 
rents after covering their expenses. We define Rents as profits before interest payments, tax, 
and depreciation (EBITDA) minus the costs of capital (cc) multiplied by total assets (TA) and 
standardized by the company’s sales (SA):  
  ( ) SATAccEBITDARents /⋅−= .     
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The costs of capital (cc) are defined as follows:  
  ( )fmf rrrcc −⋅++= βλδ , 
where rf is the risk free rate, δ is the rate of depreciation, λ is equal to the equity ratio of the 
firm, β is the estimated market beta of the firm’s stock, and rm is the return to a broad market 
index. The risk free rate is calculated as the average one month Swiss Interbank Rate over 60 
monthly values from January 1997 to December 2001 and amounts to 1.92%. Following 
Nickell (1996), the depreciation rate is assumed to be constant at 4 percent.11 The equity ratio, 
λ, is calculated as 1 minus the ratio of total (non-equity) liabilities to total assets.12 The 
market beta, β, is estimated by regressing the firm’s monthly stock returns over the past five 
years on the respective returns of the market as proxied by the Swiss Performance Index 
(SPI).13 The risk premium is equal to the average return of the Pictet-Rätzer Index, a broad 
Swiss stock market index, less the average short-term interest rate (the one month Swiss 
Interbank Rate).  
The main drawback of this type of measure of ex-post monopoly power is that it is clearly 
strongly correlated not only with market power but also with profitability, whatever the 
precise definition chosen (see also Nickell, 1996). Since we analyze the impact of product 
market competition on firm valuation and firm value is expected to be positively correlated 
with profitability, we may obtain a positive bias in our results. In fact, as our empirical results 
in Section 4 reveal, Rents affects firm value positively. To mitigate this potential bias, we 
control for the influence of profitability on Tobin’s Q by including an alternative measure, the 
return on assets, into our regression analysis.  
In addition to the firm-specific competition indicator Rents, we employ two alternative 
industry-level measures of product market competition that are presumably not afflicted with 
this problem. Specifically, we use a sales-based Herfindahl index, Herf, and an indicator 
measuring the level of regulation for new industry entrants, Reg, as additional proxy variables 
for competition. Herf is calculated as follows:  
                                                 
11  Alternatively, to test the robustness of our results to this assumption, we apply a second measure of rents based on a rate of 
depreciation of 8 percent, labeled as Rents8. The results change only immaterially (see Tables 8 and 9 in the robustness 
section). 
12  Following Nickell (1996), we also apply an alternative measure of rents, RentsL1, where λ is set equal to one. The results 
remain basically unchanged as Tables 8 and 9 in the robustness section reveal.  
13  For firms with more than one share category all variables related to stock return data are weighted based on nominal 
values. Firms with return data not available for the full period of 60 months are not excluded from our sample if return data 
could be obtained for at least 9 months. 
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where SAij is the sales attributable to firm i in industry group j, where industry groups are 
based on the classification of the Swiss Exchange (SWX). Each industry group comprises all 
quoted Swiss firms and not only the firms in our sample. As argued by Aggarwal and 
Samwick (1999), the Herfindahl index can be used as a proxy for product substitutability. Of 
course, there are also some problems associated with the use of Herf as a measure of market 
power. First, Herf does not take into account foreign competitors, a problem, which is likely 
to be especially severe in a small open economy as Switzerland. Second, our classification of 
industry groups is arbitrary and may not represent anything like the relevant product market 
for the firms included in the respective industries.14 Third, actual as well as potential 
competition influences the market power of firms within an industry and Herf does clearly not 
take into account the latter. However, Rents is supposed to be much less afflicted with these 
problems.  
Our third competition proxy, Reg, measures the intensity of legal regulations for firms 
entering a new industry. This indicator is unique in the sense that is only available for 
Switzerland in this form. It goes back to a study that was commissioned by the Swiss 
government and is described in detail in Ledergerber et al. (1998). The purpose of the study 
was to build a simple indicator that measures the intensity of regulations by law area and by 
industry in Switzerland. The industry classification includes 32 industrial sectors and is based 
on the NOGA Industry Classification System.15 Without going too much into details, the 
construction of the indicator can be described as follows: In a first step, the relevant 
regulations imposed by federal law were classified into the five categories Information Rules, 
Qualitative Standards, Quantitative Standards, Permits, and Implementation by Cantons. This 
categorization goes back to Ogus (1994) and reflects the strength of regulations, in ascending 
order, and the implied costs for firms. The category Information Rules is the weakest form of 
interventions, whereas Permits represents the strongest regulation category.16 In a second 
step, the number of regulations by law area and by regulation category was derived. In 
addition, the industries affected by each regulation were identified. Finally, the indicator was 
built by first allocating specific weights to the number of regulations by categories, where 
                                                 
14  To investigate this issue, we use an additional variation of Herf, which is based on an alternative industry definition, in the 
robustness section. In fact, we find some of the results to depend on the precise definition of Herf. 
15  NOGA stands for Nomenclature Générale des Activités Economiques.  
16  The category Implementations by Cantons was introduced to fit the specific characteristics of the Swiss system. It is 
parallel to the other categories and does not represent the strongest form of regulation.   
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stronger regulations got larger weights, and then by building the sum of these weighted 
numbers. The higher the value of the indicator, the stronger is the impact of regulations for 
firms.  
The regulation indicator Reg that we use in our study is a variation of the general indicator as 
described above. It is based on a smaller set of regulations that are specifically relevant for 
market entry. The weakest forms of interventions are categorized under Market Regulations, 
which include activities related to certifications, registrations or type tests of new products. 
The second category refers to Permits the firms have to apply for by the governmental 
authorities. The final category is denoted by Professional Licences, which are a recognized 
certification of professional capabilities. The higher the value of the indicator Reg, the 
stronger is the impact of the regulations for firms entering a new market.  
Given that these regulations are barriers to entry, fewer firms are expected to enter in highly 
regulated industries. Therefore, we interpret a high value of Reg as a low intensity of product 
market competition. Note that we divided the original values as reported in the study by 
Ledergerber et al. (1998) by 1000. Also, the information refers to the time period before 1998.  
We are aware of the fact that this indicator is not perfect, and it is vulnerable to all sorts of 
criticism. The weighting procedure, for instance, is not based on some objective criteria and is 
therefore rather arbitrary. Furthermore, the analysis is limited to federal law only, and the 
considered regulations mainly refer to small and medium companies. Nevertheless, this 
regulation indicator is still useful in the sense that it gives us some indication about the costs 
associated with entering a new industry or market, and this type of information is elsewhere 
hardly available.  
Since all three proxy variables for product market competition measure different aspects of 
competition and, hence, are afflicted with other problems, it makes perfectly sense to include 
all three variables simultaneously into the empirical investigations. To cope with a potential 
endogeneity problem related to our competition measures, we use lagged values for Rents, 
Herf, and Reg. That is, in contrast to the other variables, which in general refer to the 
reporting period from January 2002 to December 2002, our competition proxies are based on 
2001 data.17  
 
                                                 
17  The results obtained by using 2002 data for the competition proxies are reported in Tables 8 and 9 in the robustness 
section. 
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3.1.2. Measuring incentives for managers 
To measure the incentive schemes provided to managers, we use the percentage value of 
shares alloted in 2002 to the firm’s officers and directors in total relative to cash 
compensation paid during the same year, Sratio. Besides the fraction of share-based to cash 
compensation to the firm’s officers and directors, this paper considers four additional 
corporate governance mechanisms, which are assumed to provide incentives to managers and 
therefore alleviate the agency problems between managers and shareholders (see Beiner et al., 
2004). Stocksod is the sum of all shares owned by officers and executive as well as non-
executive members of the board divided by the total number of shares outstanding.18 Blocko 
denotes the percentage of cumulated voting rights exercised by large outside investors with 
voting rights exceeding 5%. Outsider refers to outside membership on the board, measured by 
the percentage of board seats held by directors without any executive function. Leverage 
denotes firm leverage and is calculated as the ratio of total (non-equity) liabilities to total 
assets.  
Besides these corporate governance mechanisms, we employ eight different control variables 
in this paper. Firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets and is labeled 
Lnassets. As a measure of profitability, we include the return on assets, ROA, which is 
calculated as operating profit in 2002 divided by the average of the 2002 starting and ending 
value of total assets. Pgrowth is the average annual sales growth over the past three years 
(2000-2002). As it is standard in the literature on the relationship between pay and 
performance, we use the change in shareholder value, CSV, as a measure of firm performance 
in our investigations related to Sratio. Following Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Funk and 
Wanzenried (2003), we define CSV as the return on equity multiplied by the market value of 
equity in the previous period. Stdv is the standard deviation of 60 monthly returns of a firm’s 
stock. Beta is the market beta estimated by regressing the firm’s monthly stock returns over 
the past five years on the respective returns of the market as proxied by the Swiss 
Performance Index (SPI). CEOP is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the chief 
executive officer (CEO) is also president of the board of directors and zero otherwise. To 
control for industry effects, we include 9 dummy variables, labeled Industry, which are equal 
to one if the firm belongs to a particular economic sector based on the classification of the 
Swiss Exchange (SWX) and zero otherwise.  
                                                 
18  Weighting has to be based on nominal values because market values are not available for all share categories of the firms 
in our sample. However, Schmid (2004) shows that for the 116 firms of his total sample of 145 Swiss firms for which he 
has market values for all existing share categories, the values of Stocksod are very close to those obtained by using 
nominal values to weigh the ownership of different share categories. 
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Finally, our measure of firm valuation is Tobin’s Q, alternatively simply labeled as Q. As 
suggested by Chung and Pruitt (1994), Perfect and Wiles (1994), Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996), Kang and Stulz (1996), and Loderer and Peyer (2002), among others, Tobin’s Q is 
estimated as the ratio of the market value of equity plus the book value of debt to the book 
value of total assets. To avoid that fluctuations in the market value of firms’ equity influence 
our results, we follow Beiner et al. (2004) and Schmid (2004) and compute the market value 
of equity as the mean of daily observations during 2002.19 Definitions of all variables 
employed in this study are also provided in Table 1.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
3.2. Sample description 
As a starting point we target all 275 firms quoted at the Swiss Exchange (SWX) by the end of 
2002. The exclusion of investment companies leaves us with a sample of 235 firms. 
Compensation data (Sratio, Stocksod) is available for 171 firms. Another 13 firms must be 
dropped because no data on Rents, our standard measure of product market competition, is 
available. Finally, the exclusion of two obvious outliers concerning their value of ROA and 
Rents leaves us with a sample of 156 firms for our cross-sectional regression analysis.  
Data has been collected from different sources and generally refers to the reporting period 
from January 2002 to December 2002. The necessary data to compute Rents, Herf, Q, 
Leverage, Lnassets, ROA, Pgrowth, CSV, Stdv, and Beta were obtained from Datastream and 
Worldscope. Data for the variables Blocko, Bsize, Outsider, and CEOP stems from the 
website of “Finanz & Wirtschaft”20 and the “Swiss Stock Guide 2002/2003”. However, for 
most variables data was not available for all firms in our sample. Missing values were 
obtained from the companies’ annual reports. Sratio and Stockod have been directly collected 
from the 2002 annual reports of the companies covered in this study. Reg is taken from the 
report “Regelungsdichte nach Branchen” by Ledergerber et al. (1998). Finally, the variable 
Industry is based on the classification of the Swiss Exchange (SWX) and stems from the 
SWX website.21  
 
                                                 
19  For some firms daily stock price data is not available for all share categories on Datastream, and we replace them by the 
mean of the 2001 and 2002 year end values of total market capitalization obtained from Worldscope. 
20  The website of “Finanz und Wirtschaft”, Switzerland’s major financial newspaper, is: www.finanzinfo.ch.  
21  The website of the Swiss Exchange is: www.swx.ch. 
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3.3. Descriptive statistics  
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of all variables included in our analysis. The negative 
average value of Rents indicates that Swiss firms burn capital in 2001, on average.22 
However, the median value is positive and amounts to 2.9%. The mean and the median of 
Herf are quite similar; 0.412 and 0.409, respectively. Reg takes on average a value of 1.27. It 
has a low of 0.72 for the information technology industry, and a high of 3.26 for the travel 
industry, which faces the highest market entry regulations. The average value of Tobin’s Q is 
1.41, and the median is 1.13, indicating that Swiss firms, on average, invest in positive NPV 
projects. Concerning our measure of incentive schemes provided to managers, Sratio, we find 
that total share-based compensation to officers and directors amounts to 5.7% of cash-based 
compensation, on average, while the median value is zero. This quite small values are not 
surprising as Murphy (1999) shows, that stock (and option) participation plans for the top 
management are relatively rare in Switzerland and account for a much smaller fraction of total 
compensation than in most other countries and especially as compared to the US.23  
Table 2 further shows several other interesting results, which we only briefly summarize: 
Officers and directors hold on average 16.5% of the equity of a firm. However, the median of 
2.6% is much smaller, indicating that there are some firms in our sample where officers and 
directors hold very large fractions of total equity. A comparison of these values to the samples 
of U.S. firms used by Loderer and Martin (1997) and Anderson et al. (2000) confirms that 
average insider shareholdings are even slightly higher in Switzerland than in the U.S. 
However, the median is a lot smaller in our sample and, hence, insider shareholdings are 
much more skewed in Switzerland. Many other firm characteristics are comparable to those 
reported by other studies in this area. However, the mean value of Blocko of 28% is much 
larger than the value of 7.6% reported by Anderson et al. (2000) for the U.S. Similarly, the 
average value of Outsider is 87.9%, which strongly differs from the much lower values of 
54% and 60% reported by Yermack (1996) and Barnhart et al. (1994), respectively, for U.S. 
companies and 44% reported by Peasnell et al. (2003) for U.K. companies. This finding is 
especially surprising, because founding families are still regarded as an important factor in 
corporate Switzerland.  
                                                 
22  Two different reasons may be responsible for this somewhat surprising finding. First, 2001 was a worldwide down-market 
and many firms experienced substantial losses. Second, our measure of profits included in the calculation of Rents 
(EBITDA) contains a number of balance sheet items that can potentially distort the economic content of this variable, 
resulting in values of EBITDA that are downward-biased measures of raw operating surplus (e.g., see Januszewski et al., 
2002).  
23  Murphy (1999) compares the level and structure of CEO pay in 23 countries based on data reported in Towers Perrin’s 
1997 ‘Worldwide Total Remuneration’ report. 
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[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
3.4. Correlations 
Table 3 shows the correlation coefficients between all variables included in the empirical 
analysis of Section 4. Of special interest are the correlation coefficients between Rents, Herf, 
Reg, Sratio, and Q. Consistent with the implications of our theoretical model, we find a 
positive correlation coefficient between Rents and Q and a negative and significant coefficient 
between Rents and Sratio. Based on our theoretical model, this latter result suggests that firms 
may be operating in competitive environments on average, where more intensive product 
market competition is associated with stronger incentives provided to managers by increasing 
the fraction of share-based compensation (see hypothesis 1). The relatively high and 
statistically significant positive correlation coefficient between Rents and ROA is expected as 
mentioned in Section 3.1. Consistent with the main hypothesis of Raith (2003), the correlation 
coefficients between all three competition proxies and Beta and Stdv are negative. Raith 
(2003) argues that firms operating in an intensive competition environment experience a 
higher volatility of profits, which, in turn, leads to higher stock price volatility and arguably 
higher market betas.  
With respect to the two other measures of competition, we find a negative correlation 
coefficient between Herf and Q and a significant positive relation between Reg and Q, 
indicating that the different product market competition proxies measure different aspects of 
competition. The correlation between Herf and Sratio is positive and that between Reg and 
Sratio negative but both coefficients are not statistically significant. Furthermore, Rents is 
negatively correlated with Herf and positively correlated with Reg. However, both 
correlations are weak and not statistically significant, confirming the conjecture that all three 
proxy variables for competition measure different aspects of product market competition.24 
Thus, we conclude from this correlation analysis that our empirical investigation should 
include both firm-level as well as industry-level measures of competition.  
Let us finally look at the corporate governance mechanisms. Sratio and Stocksod are 
positively correlated with Q, while Blocko, Leverage, and Outsider are negatively correlated 
with Q. Rents is only very weakly correlated with all corporate governance mechanisms 
(besides Sratio) and no coefficient is statistically significant. The same is true for Herf and 
                                                 
24  Hence, collinearity problems should not be likely when using all three competition measures simultaneously in the 
empirical analysis. 
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Reg with the exception of significant correlation coefficients between Stocksod and Herf and 
Stocksod and Reg. Sratio is negatively correlated with Blocko indicating possible substitution 
effects between the monitoring by large outside blockholders and using share-based 
compensation to tie the personal wealth of officers and directors to their company’s 
performance. As the positive and statistically significant coefficient between Sratio and 
Lnassets indicates, share-based compensation seems to be more common in large than in 
small firms. Interestingly, a CEO who is by the same time president of the board seems to be 
associated with higher values of Sratio as well. Finally and consistent with earlier empirical 
findings (e.g., see Jensen and Murphy, 1990, or Funk and Wanzenried, 2003), we find a 
significantly positive correlation coefficient between Sratio and firm performance as 
measured by the change in shareholder value (CSV).  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1. Comparisons of firms operating in intensive competition environment and 
other firms 
We begin our empirical analysis by investigating whether there are systematic differences 
with respect to the variables employed in this study between firms operating in an intensive 
competition environment and firms which do not. Table 4 presents comparisons of mean and 
median values between firms with a value of Rents equal to or above the median value (non-
competition firms) and firms with a value of Rents below the median value (competition 
firms).  
Most importantly, we find that non-competition firms have significantly higher values of 
Tobin’s Q than competition firms indicating that the lower economic rents, and therefore 
profits, associated with a higher product market competition outweigh the potential benefits 
of reducing managerial slack. This finding is consistent with our third hypothesis. 
Furthermore and consistent with our theoretical model, Sratio is higher for competition firms. 
Even though the difference is not statistically significant at any conventional level, this 
outcome may provide some evidence for our theoretical findings that the relationship between 
the strength of incentives and the intensity of competition differs depending on the level of 
product market competition. In particular, it is consistent with our second hypothesis, stating 
that the relationship between incentives and competition becomes steeper with increasing 
competition.  
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Table 4 furthermore reveals a significantly higher profitability, as measured by ROA, of non-
competition firms. This result is expected since ROA and Rents are correlated by 
construction.25 For the same reason, the significantly higher mean and median values of the 
change in shareholder value CSV, which is also some measure of profitability, of non-
competition firms as compared to competition firms comes as no surprise. The finding of 
significantly higher leverage ratios of competition firms stands in line with Lord and 
McIntyre Jr. (2003), who provide evidence for leverage increasing with import competition in 
the textile and apparel industry.26 Finally, competition firms have significantly higher mean 
and median values of Stdv and Beta. A possible reason for that finding is that firms operating 
in an intensive competition environment experience a higher volatility of profits (e.g., see 
Raith, 2003), which, in turn, leads to higher stock price volatility and arguably higher market 
betas.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
4.2. Multivariate OLS-regressions 
In this section, we investigate the influence of product market competition on Sratio and 
Tobin’s Q by controlling for different governance mechanisms and control variables in a 
multivariate regression framework. First, we motivate the regression equation aimed to 
investigate the determinants of Sratio and report the results of OLS estimations. Then, we 
examine the effect of competition on Tobin’s Q.  
 
4.2.1. The effect of product market competition on incentive schemes 
Since our main interest is to investigate the effect of product market competition on incentive 
schemes, we include Rents, Herf, or Reg as a first explanatory variable into our regression 
equation with Sratio as a dependent variable. Because managers are more likely to accept 
share-based compensation when they are confident that their company will do well and it is 
beneficial for them to participate on this success, we include Tobin’s Q as a forward-looking 
performance measure of the firm. To investigate whether there are any interrelations between 
Sratio and other governance mechanisms (e.g., see Beiner et al., 2004), we also include 
Stocksod, Blocko, Leverage, and Outsider.  
                                                 
25  As Table 3 reveals, the correlation coefficient between ROA and Rents is 0.342 and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
26  Other work on the relationship between leverage and competition include Brander and Lewis (1986), Maksimovic (1988), 
Chevalier (1995), Kovenock and Phillips (1995), Phillips (1995), and Zingales (1998). 
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Besides the measures of product market competition and governance mechanisms, we include 
four control variables. The first is firm size, Lnassets. Because larger firms operating in an 
international environment are more likely to adopt share-based compensation, we expect 
Sratio to be higher for larger firms. As it is standard in the literature on the relationship 
between pay and performance, we use the change in shareholder value, CSV, as an additional 
control variable. CSV is expected to have a positive impact on Sratio. In contrast, we expect 
Sratio to be lower where the costs of the shareholdings are higher. As a measure of these 
costs, which arise mainly from holding an under-diversified portfolio, we use the standard 
deviation of 60 monthly returns of a firm’s stock, Stdv. Thus, we expect Sratio to be 
negatively related to Stdv. The fourth control variable we include into our regression equation 
is CEOP. The concentration of power associated with a CEO who is by the same time 
president of the board may increase the demand for aligned interests. Thus, we expect 
managers and directors, but especially the CEO, to be compensated by a higher fraction of 
performance dependent wages. Finally, to control for industry effects, we include eight 
dummy variables, Industry. Summarizing, the regression equation is:  
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 (4.1)  
The results of an OLS estimation of equation 4.1 are reported in Column 1 of Table 5. 
Consistent with our theoretical model, we find a negative coefficient on Rents indicating that 
a more intense product market competition is associated with stronger incentive schemes for 
managers as measured by the fraction of share-based to cash compensation. Therefore, firms 
operating in a competitive environment seem to provide stronger managerial incentives 
because competition raises the marginal cost of poor managerial decisions. Q has a positive 
influence on Sratio indicating that managers are more likely to accept share-based 
compensation when their company is expected to perform well. This result is consistent with 
the findings of Chung and Pruitt (1996) who find managers to hold more shares of their 
company when they are optimistic about its future prospects. However, in contrast to 
managerial shareholdings of which managers can freely dispose of after a vesting period, it is 
doubtful that managers have a significant influence on the determination of Sratio and, thus, 
the coefficient is not statistically significant. Stocksod is also positively but not significantly 
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related to Sratio. Thus, firms with already relatively high managerial shareholdings tend to 
pay higher fractions of share-based compensation to their officers and directors. The 
significantly negative coefficient on Blocko reveals that monitoring by outside blockholders 
reduces the demand for incentive alignment of managers and directors. This result is 
consistent with the findings of Agrawal und Knoeber (1996) and Beiner et al. (2004) that 
large outside blockholdings are an alternative mechanism for shareholdings by officers and 
directors. The same seems to be true for Leverage. However, the coefficient is not statistically 
significant. In contrast, as indicated by the positive and significant coefficient, Outsider seems 
not to be a substitute for share-based compensation. A higher fraction of outsiders on the 
board seems to enhance incentive alignments of managers and directors by increasing the 
ratio of share-based to cash compensation. This result suggests that outside board members 
encourage share-based compensation contracts.  
With respect to the control variables only CSV and CEOP have a significant effect on Sratio. 
Consistent with Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Funk and Wanzenried (2002), CSV has a 
positive influence on Sratio indicating a positive relation between the percentage of share-
based to cash compensation and past firm performance. The significantly positive coefficient 
on CEOP indicates that the concentration of power associated with the CEO being president 
of the board by the same time, increases the demand for share-based compensation to align 
the interests between managers and shareholders.  
Column 2 of Table 5 reports the results of an OLS regression of equation 4.1, which includes 
Herf as a measure of product market competition instead of Rents. In contrast to Rents, the 
coefficient on Herf is positive indicating a negative relation between competition and Sratio. 
However, the p-value of 0.912 shows that Herf has basically no influence on Sratio. The 
coefficients on all other variables are robust to replacing Rents by Herf and remain basically 
unchanged.  
The results of an OLS regression of equation 4.1 including Reg as competition proxy are very 
similar to those obtained for Rents (see Column 3 of Table 5). Again, the coefficient is 
negative indicating a positive, though not significant, relation between competition and 
Sratio. All other coefficients are very similar to those reported in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5.  
Since all three competition variables measure different aspects of product market competition, 
we also estimate equation 4.1 by including all three measures of competition. As the results in 
Column 4 of Table 5 reveal, the coefficients on Rents and Reg remain negative, but not 
statistically significant at any conventional level. In contrast to the results reported in Column 
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2, the coefficient on Herf is now also negative, indicating a positive relation between 
competition and incentive schemes provided to managers. The coefficients on all other 
variables remain basically unchanged. An F-test for the simultaneous significance of all 
coefficients (except the constant and the industry dummies) rejects the null hypothesis that 
they are jointly zero in all four equations and the adjusted R-squares are between 0.204 and 
0.318.  
As a direct test of our hypothesis 2, we separately estimate equation 4.1 for firms in a high 
and firms in a low competition environment. We split our sample into two subsamples based 
on the value of Rents. “Competition firms” are firms with a value of Rents below the median 
value and “non-competition firms” are those firms with a value of Rents equal to or above the 
median value. Based on hypothesis 2, which states that the marginal effect of competition on 
the incentives provided to managers increases with the intensity of product market 
competition, we expect higher coefficients on the competition proxies for “competition 
firms”. In fact, Columns 5 and 6 of Table 5 reveal that the coefficients on all three 
competition proxies are higher (in absolute terms) for firms operating in a high competition 
environment than for firms operating in a low competition environment.  
The empirical results of this section reveal that in general a more intense product market 
competition is associated with stronger incentive schemes for managers as measured by the 
fraction of share-based to cash compensation. This result is consistent with hypothesis 1 and 
suggests that firms are operating in competitive environments on average. Moreover and 
consistent with hypothesis 2, we find the (positive) influence of competition on incentive 
schemes to be stronger for firms operating in a high competition environment.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
4.2.2. The effect of competition on firm value 
To test our third hypothesis, which is to examine the effect of product market competition on 
firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q, we additionally estimate an OLS regression of Q on the 
three measures of competition, Rents, Herf, or Reg. Since the additional monitoring on 
managers associated with a more intense product market competition may be a substitute for 
incentive schemes and other governance mechanisms, we also include Sratio and the four 
governance mechanisms, Stocksod, Blocko, Leverage, and Outsider into the regression 
equation. Finally, we include four control variables. Lnassets and Pgrowth aim to control for 
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growth opportunities. Thus, we expect a positive relationship between Pgrowth and Q and a 
negative influence of Lnassets on Q, because growth opportunities tend to be lower for larger 
firms. Based on simple valuation models, Q may additionally depend on ROA and Beta. 
Finally, to control for industry effects, we again include eight dummy variables, Industry. 
Summarizing, the regression equation is:  
iij
j
j
iiiii
iiiiii
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 (4.2)  
The results of estimating equation 4.2 by OLS are reported in Table 6. As Column 1 reveals, 
Rents has a positive but not statistically significant effect on firm value indicating that a 
higher product market competition as measured by a firm’s rents is associated with a lower 
firm value. Thus, the negative effect of lower economic rents seems to outweigh the positive 
effect of reducing managerial slack and increasing the managers’ effort by providing 
additional monitoring and increasing the threat of liquidation. This result is consistent with 
our third hypothesis. In contrast, Habib and Ljungqvist (2004) provide evidence that firm 
value is positively related to product market competition.  
As Columns 2 and 3 reveal, Herf and Reg have a positive effect on Q as well. However, both 
coefficients are not statistically significant. Herf measures the market power of the firms in an 
industry. From standard microeconomic theory it is well known that profits are higher when 
firms have more market power. As to the level of regulation within an industry concerning 
new market entrants, Reg, the positive effect is due to the fact that regulations are similar to 
barriers to entry that protect the incumbents from competition. The positive effect of all three 
measures of competition is robust to the estimation of a regression equation including Rents, 
Herf, and Reg (see Column 4).  
The coefficients on Sratio, the four governance mechanisms, and the control variables are 
very similar in all four regression equations. Consistent with the findings of Schmid (2004), 
Sratio has a positive but not statistically significant effect on firm value. The only statistically 
significant governance mechanism is Stocksod, which is significantly positively related to 
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Tobin’s Q in columns (1) and (3).27 With respect to the other governance mechanisms, we 
find negative coefficients on Blocko and Outsider and a positive coefficient on Leverage. The 
negative effect of Blocko may be due to an entrenchment effect (e.g., see Morck et al., 1988). 
The coefficient on Outsider is also negative but the p-values between 0.544 and 0.632 are 
quite high.28 The positive effect of Leverage is consistent with both a trade-off theory of 
capital structure and Jensen’s (1986) free cash-flow theory. An inspection of the control 
variables reveals, that Lnassets seems to be unrelated with Q (p-values between 0.895 and 
0.998). The coefficients on ROA, Pgrowth, and Beta are all positive, while only ROA and 
Beta are statistically significant.  
An F-test for the simultaneous significance of all coefficients (except the constant and the 
industry dummies) always rejects the null hypothesis that they are jointly zero and the 
adjusted R-squares between 0.500 and 0.507 are quite high.  
The empirical results of this section are consistent with hypothesis 3 of our theoretical model. 
For all three competition proxies, we find a positive but not statistically significant effect on 
firm value indicating that a higher product market competition is associated with a lower firm 
value. Thus, the negative effect of lower economic rents seems to outweigh the positive effect 
of reducing managerial slack and increasing the managers’ effort by providing additional 
monitoring and increasing the threat of liquidation.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
4.3. The problem of endogeneity: A simultaneous equations analysis 
A possible concern with respect to our OLS results is that some of our right-hand-side 
variables are correlated with the error term of the respective equation and, thus, that our 
results are affected by a possible endogeneity of some of the variables included in our 
regression equations (e.g., see Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; and Beiner et al., 2004). 
To investigate whether our results suffer from an endogeneity bias, we implement a Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test (e.g., see Hausman, 1978; and Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993) on the 
endogeneity of Sratio and Q. The test involves a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, each 
                                                 
27  The inclusion of a quadratic term of Stocksod reveals that the relation between Stocksod and Tobin’s Q is parabolic, but 
leaves all other results basically unchanged. Empirical evidence on a parabolic relationship between managerial 
shareholdings and firm value is provided by McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Schmid (2004), for example. 
28  The finding of a negative effect of the fraction of outside directors on the board is consistent with the results of Agrawal 
and Knoeber (1996), who find Outsider to be the only governance mechanism having a significant influence on Tobin’s Q. 
However, they have no plausible explanation for this result. 
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presumably endogenous variable (i.e., Sratio and Q) is regressed on all other variables 
included in the two regression equations. Then, predicted values for the dependent variables 
are calculated using the estimated coefficients from these first-stage regressions. In the second 
stage, each dependent variable is regressed on the predicted values of the presumably 
endogenous variable and the respective right-hand-side variables of that regression equation. 
The significance of the predicted right-hand-side dependent variable is then tested using a T-
test with the null hypothesis of no endogeneity. 
We report the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test statistics with the respective p-values in each 
Column of Tables 5 and 6 below the OLS results. In no case are we able to reject the null 
hypothesis of no endogeneity, suggesting that estimating the equations as a simultaneous 
system is not necessary or appropriate. However, as pointed out by Johnston and DiNardo 
(1997) among others, the test results can be inconclusive, first, because the test is designed for 
large samples, and, second, because it may either reflect that the endogeneity bias of the 
parameters estimated with OLS is not serious or that the predetermined variables excluded 
from the structural equations are only weakly correlated with the endogenous variables. 
Following Cohen and Walsh (2000) and notwithstanding the appropriateness of the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman specification test for a relatively small sample such as ours, we check the 
robustness of our results by estimating both regression equations simultaneously by 3SLS. 
The results are reported in Table 7. Panel A presents the estimates for the equation with Sratio 
as dependent variable and Panel B those for the equation with Q as dependent variable. As a 
comparison with the OLS results reported in Tables 5 and 6 reveals, the simultaneous 
estimation of the two equations leaves the majority of the OLS results unchanged. Most 
importantly, Rents has now a significantly negative influence on Sratio confirming that a 
more intense product market competition as measured by lower economic rents is associated 
with stronger incentive schemes for managers (see Panel A). The coefficient of Reg in column 
3 stands in line with this finding, even though the result is not significant. Column 4 further 
shows that the coefficient on Herf is also negative if all three measures of competition are 
included in the system. Panel B reveals that the effects of Rents, Herf and Reg on Q are still 
positive confirming that the negative effect of lower economic rents dominates the positive 
effect of reducing managerial slack and increasing the managers’ effort by providing 
additional monitoring and increasing the threat of liquidation. However, all three coefficients 
are not statistically significant for equations investigating the effect of each competition proxy 
separately. In contrast, the inclusion of all three measures of competition into the two 
equations of the system leads to a coefficient on Herf which is statistically significant at the 
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10% level. With respect to the corporate governance mechanisms and control variables, there 
are barely any changes between the OLS and 3SLS estimates. The coefficient of Outsider on 
Sratio is still positive but not statistically significant any more (Panel A) and the coefficient of 
Pgrowth on Q is now significant at the 1% level. 
To test for the correctness of the specification of our entire system of simultaneous equations, 
we apply the Hausman specification test (e.g., see Hausman, 1978; and Hausman, 1983).29 As 
the results in Table 7 reveal, the Hausman test statistic cannot be rejected at the 10% level for 
both equations of our system. Thus, under the assumption that at least one of the two 
equations are correctly specified, the specification of the system of two simultaneous 
equations cannot be rejected and hence the most efficient estimates can be obtained by 
applying 3SLS.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
5. Robustness Tests 
In this section, we investigate the robustness of our empirical results with respect to 
alternative definitions of the competition variables Rents, Herf, and Reg. With respect to 
Rents, we employ three additional, alternative definitions. First, we investigate whether our 
results are robust to the use of 2002 data for the variable Rents, Rents_02. Second, we apply a 
second measure of Rents based on a rate of depreciation (δ) of 8 percent (instead of 4 
percent), Rents8. Following Nickell (1996), we finally apply an alternative measure of Rents 
where the equity ratio (λ) is set equal to one for all firms, RentsL1. With respect to Herf, we 
use two alternative measures. Again, the first is based on 2002 data for the calculation of 
Herf. The second is based on an alternative classification of the relevant industries and uses 
“market sectors” instead of “industry groups”.30 Market sectors are defined to be broader than 
industry sectors leading to a reduction from 33 to 17 industries underlying the calculations of 
the Herfindahl index. This variable is labeled as Herf_MaSe. Finally, we use an alternative 
                                                 
29  The test statistic of the Hausman specification test is based on a comparison of the 2SLS and 3SLS estimates. Under the 
null hypothesis of no misspecification, the 3SLS results are consistent and efficient while the 2SLS results are consistent 
but not efficient. The test investigates for each equation whether the 3SLS results are inconsistent due to a misspecification 
in one of the other equations. Under 3SLS, the misspecification of one single equation is transmitted to all equations by the 
use of an inconsistently estimated covariance matrix in the third stage. In contrast, under 2SLS only the single equation 
that is misspecified is affected by the misspecification. Thus, the crucial assumption of the test is that at least one equation 
of the system is correctly specified (if this is not the case, 2SLS as well as 3SLS results are inconsistent and the Hausman 
specification test is not meaningful). If the null is rejected, there is a misspecification somewhere in the system. However, 
the test does not provide any suggestions about what has to be changed in the system. The Hausman test statistic is 
distributed Chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number of over-identifying restrictions (the number of 
instruments included in the system less the number of regressors in the respective equation).  
30  Industry groups as well as market sectors are both based on the classification of the Swiss Exchange (SWX). 
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definition of Reg, Reg_General, measuring not only the intensity of legal regulations that are 
specifically relevant for market entry but the level of regulation within the respective industry 
in general. 
To investigate the robustness of our results with respect to these alternative definitions of our 
competition proxies, we reestimate the regression equations reported in Column 4 of Table 5 
(Sratio) and Column 4 of Table 6 (Q) by OLS. The results in Table 8 reveal that our results 
with respect to Sratio are robust to replacing any one of the three competition variables 
(Rents, Herf, and Reg) by one of the alternatives. The use of 2002 data leads to a coefficient 
on Rents which is statistically significant at the 1% level. All other coefficients remain 
basically unchanged. Table 9 reports the results with respect to Tobin’s Q. Again, the results 
are quite robust against the use of alternative definitions of the competition variables. Two 
exceptions are the negative sign on Rents_02 (Column 2) and the negative sign on Herf_MaSe 
(Column 6). However, both p-values, especially the former, are quite high: 0.875 and 0.476, 
respectively.  
In general, we conclude that our results are robust to the use of alternative definitions for our 
three measures of product market competition. However, as already mentioned in Section 
3.1.1, our classification of industry groups is arbitrary and may not represent anything like the 
relevant product market for the firms included in the respective industries. Thus, the finding 
of a positive coefficient on Herf and a negative on Herf_MaSe may, in fact, suggest that the 
results with respect to the Herfindahl index depend on the precise definition of the relevant 
industries.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
6. Conclusion 
Our paper is a further contribution to better understand the effects of competition on 
compensation schemes for managers and on firm valuation. While the theoretical literature 
offers some insights on this issue, the picture is far from being complete, and more research is 
clearly needed in this area. Given that the theoretical models often lead to ambiguous results, 
it seems especially important to provide further empirical evidence on these subjects. This 
topic has become even more relevant with the increasing influence of public organizations on 
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corporate governance rules and the general insight that competition is necessary for a culture 
of good corporate governance.  
In the theoretical section we consider a principal-agent model within a Cournot setup where 
the manager provides unobservable effort to affect the firm’s marginal costs. The key features 
of our model are as follows: First, it relies on neither on information effects of competition 
nor on relative performance evaluation. Second, it integrates strategic interaction on product 
markets between the firms. These features provide an accurate description of firm behavior 
and lead to testable hypotheses in terms of observable variables.   
The empirical part tests the main hypotheses of our theoretical model on the relationship 
between competition, managerial incentives and firm valuation with data of 156 Swiss 
companies. Our empirical results reveal that in general a more intense product market 
competition is associated with stronger incentive schemes for managers as measured by the 
fraction of share-based to cash compensation. This result is consistent with hypothesis 1 of 
our theoretical model and suggests that firms are operating in competitive environments on 
average. Moreover and consistent with hypothesis 2, we find the positive influence of 
competition on incentive schemes to be stronger for firms operating in a high competition 
environment. Finally and consistent with hypothesis 3 of our model, we find a positive but not 
statistically significant effect on firm value for all three competition proxies indicating that a 
higher product market competition is associated with a lower firm value. Thus, the negative 
effect of lower economic rents seems to outweigh the positive effect of reducing managerial 
slack and increasing the managers’ effort by providing additional monitoring and increasing 
the threat of liquidation.  
While our work provides some potentially insightful results, it also raises further questions 
that have to be addressed in future work. It would be interesting to look not only at public 
companies, but also consider small and medium sized private corporations that build the core 
part of many economies. More importantly, due to the increasing importance of option-based 
pay it is obvious that Sratio is an incomplete measure of the incentive schemes provided to 
officers and directors.31 Hence, it would be interesting to enhance our analysis by using the 
fraction of share- and option-based pay to cash compensation as an alternative, and arguably 
more complete, measure of the incentive schemes provided to managers.32 Also, more 
detailed compensation and performance data not only from the top, but also from the middle 
management could be of some interest since some important corporate decisions are taken on 
                                                 
31 Recent evidence on the development of option-based pay in the US is given by Hall and Murphy (2002), for example. 
32 Unfortunately, data on option allotment and ownership is very sparse for Swiss companies in 2002.  
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this level. Finally, increasing governmental interventions on corporate governance issues call 
for a good understanding of the role of public policy.  
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Table 1: Definition of variables 
Rents Measure of ex-post monopoly power defined as profits before interest payments, tax, and 
depreciation minus the costs of capital multiplied by total assets and standardized by the 
company’s sales 
Herf A sales-based Herfindahl index 
Reg Measure of the intensity of regulation by federal law for entering a new market 
Q Ratio of market value to book value of assets. Market value of assets is computed as 
market value of equity plus book value of assets minus book value of equity. 
Sratio Fraction of share-based to cash compensation to the firm’s officers and directors 
Stocksod Percentage of equity owned by officers and directors  
Blocko Percentage of cumulated voting rights exercised by large investors with >5% of voting 
rights (excluding officers, directors, and related persons) 
Leverage Leverage, measured as the ratio of total (non-equity) liabilities to total assets 
Outsider Outsider membership on the board, measured by the percentage of board seats held by 
non-officers without relationship to the founding family (if any) 
Lnassets Firm size, measured by the natural logarithm of book value of total assets 
ROA Return on assets, defined as the ratio of operating income to total assets 
Pgrowth Average annual growth of sales over the past three years (2000-2002) 
CSV Change in shareholder value in million CHF as measured by the return on equity multiplied 
by the market value of equity in the previous period 
Stdv Standard deviation of stock returns, estimated from 60 monthly stock returns 
Beta Beta, estimated from 60 monthly stock returns 
CEOP 1, if the CEO is also the president of the board; 0 otherwise 
Industry 9 industry dummy variables 
 
This table provides definitions of all variables included in the empirical investigations of this study 
(Sections 4 and 5). Alternative measures of product market competition are defined in Section 5 
investigating the robustness of our results. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics of variables 
 
            
   Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. 
    
Rents -0.042 0.029 5.672 -5.680 0.733 
Herf 0.412 0.409 1.000 0.131 0.230 
Reg 1.274 1.0160 3.257 0.724 0.552 
Q 1.415 1.130 7.710 0.581 0.918 
Sratio 0.057 0.000 0.878 0.000 0.142 
Stocksod 0.165 0.026 0.858 0.000 0.224 
Blocko 0.280 0.198 1.000 0.000 0.271 
Leverage 0.578 0.587 1.138 0.074 0.213 
Outsider 0.879 0.875 1.000 0.400 0.133 
Lnassets 13.638 13.431 20.890 10.083 1.742 
ROA 0.024 0.046 0.334 -0.610 0.122 
Pgrowth 0.157 0.060 3.973 -0.624 0.466 
CSV 0.909 0.038 32.728 -2.430 4.231 
Stdv 0.394 0.342 1.118 0.057 0.204 
Beta 0.863 0.790 3.279 -0.224 0.582 
CEOP 0.192 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.395 
 
This table reports the summary statistics of all variables included in the 
empirical investigations of this study (Section 4), with the exception of 
Industry and the alternative measures of product market competition employed 
in the robustness section. The variables are the following: A measure of ex-post 
rents (Rents), sales-based Herfindahl index (Herf), level of  regulations for 
market entry (Reg), Tobin’s Q (Q), ratio of share-based to cash compensation 
(Sratio), the percentage of equity owned by officers and directors (Stocksod), 
cumulated voting rights by outside blockholders (Blocko), leverage (Leverage), 
the fraction of outside directors on the board (Outsider), log of book value of 
total assets (Lnassets), return on assets (ROA), average annual sales growth 
over the past three years (Pgrowth), change in shareholder value (CSV), 
standard deviation of stock returns (Stdv), market beta (Beta), and a dummy 
variable whether the CEO is also the president of the board (CEOP). The data 
generally refers to the reporting period from January 2002 to December 2002 
and the sample size is 156. 
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Table 3: Correlation analysis 
 
    Rents Herf  Reg Q Sratio Stocksod Blocko Leverage Outsider Lnassets ROA Pgrowth CSV Stdv Beta 
 Herf                               
                             
                              
                            
                            
                             
                           
                          
                        
                      
                        
                        
                     
                    
                     
                        
                    
                    
                    
                   
                    
                    
                  
                 
                  
               
                 
              
                
                 
               
-0.1005
   0.2119
 Reg 0.0721 0.1579**
   0.3713
  
0.0490
 
 Q 0.0353 -0.0513 0.1890**
   0.6614 0.5250 0.0181
 Sratio
 
-0.3068*** 0.0804 -0.0142 0.0622  
   0.0001 0.3181 0.8602 0.4403  
 Stocksod
 
 -0.0845 0.1569* 0.1531* 0.1438* -0.0027     
   0.2945 0.0504 0.0564 0.0734 0.9738
 Blocko
 
0.0515 0.0273 -0.0545 -0.1705** -0.1860** -0.2775***  
   0.5232 0.7354 0.4989 0.0334 0.0201 0.0005   
 Leverage
 
 -0.0647 0.1045 -0.0996 -0.2166*** 0.0279 -0.2793*** 0.2583***  
   0.4222 0.1941 0.2162 0.0066 0.7293 0.0004 0.0011  
 Outsider
 
0.0787 -0.0343 0.0478 -0.0533 0.0599 -0.1986** 0.0901 0.2330***
   0.3290 0.6705 0.5531 0.5088 0.4574 0.0130 0.2635 0.0034  
 Lnassets
 
-0.0744 0.0527 0.0935 0.0723 0.2915*** -0.2485*** 0.0481 0.4067*** 0.2997***
   0.3560 0.5133 0.2458 0.3697 0.0002 0.0018 0.5512 0.0000 0.0001
 ROA 0.3420*** -0.0887 0.1310 0.2308*** 0.0004 -0.0330 -0.0657 -0.0302 0.1754** 0.2612***
   0.0000 0.2709 0.1031 0.0038 0.9965 0.6823 0.4149 0.7084 0.0285 0.0010
 Pgrowth
 
-0.1356* -0.0821 0.0029 0.2705*** -0.0152 -0.0332 0.0745 -0.0576 0.0071 -0.0015 -0.1203
   0.0914 0.3082 0.9711 0.0006 0.8510 0.6804 0.3556 0.4749 0.9304 0.9854 0.1348
 CSV -0.0267 0.1599** 0.1633** 0.2438*** 0.4169*** -0.0946 -0.0758 0.0134 0.0643 0.5071*** 0.1376* -0.0583
   0.7406 0.0461 0.0416 0.0022 0.0000 0.2399 0.3469 0.8683 0.4249 0.0000 0.0867 0.4694
 Stdv -0.2225*** -0.1516* -0.2002** 0.1612** -0.0099 0.0789 -0.1595** -0.1624** -0.3149*** -0.3435*** -0.5362*** 0.0859 -0.1515*
   0.0052 0.0588 0.0122 0.0444 0.9019 0.3277 0.0467 0.0428 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.2866 0.0590
 Beta -0.0152 -0.1730** -0.1509* 0.2480*** -0.0107 0.0337 -0.2288*** -0.0872 -0.1030 0.0004 -0.2810*** 0.0744 -0.0266 0.7239***
   0.8504 0.0308 0.0601 0.0018 0.8946 0.6765 0.0041 0.2790 0.2008 0.9963 0.0004 0.3563 0.7416 0.0000
 CEOP
 
-0.0389 0.0003 -0.0329 0.0956 0.1959** 0.0747 -0.0615 -0.1520* -0.4045*** -0.0101 -0.0084 0.0295 0.1400* 0.1797** 0.0957
   0.6297 0.9975 0.6833 0.2349 0.0142 0.3543 0.4455 0.0582 0.0000 0.9004 0.9167 0.7144 0.0812 0.0248 0.2349
 
This table reports Pearson correlation coefficients between all variables included in the empirical investigations of this study (Section 4), with the exception of Industry and 
the alternative measures of product market competition employed in the robustness section. The variables are the following: A measure of ex-post rents (Rents), sales-based 
Herfindahl index (Herf), level of regulations for market entry (Reg), Tobin’s Q (Q), ratio of share-based to cash compensation (Sratio), the percentage of equity owned by 
officers and directors (Stocksod), cumulated voting rights by outside blockholders (Blocko), leverage (Leverage), the fraction of outside directors on the board (Outsider), log 
of book value of total assets (Lnassets), return on assets (ROA), average annual sales growth over the past three years (Pgrowth), change in shareholder value (CSV), standard 
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deviation of stock returns (Stdv), market beta (Beta), and a dummy variable whether the CEO is also the president of the board (CEOP). The data generally refers to the 
reporting period from January 2002 to December 2002 and the sample size is 156. The p-values are in parentheses. ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% 
level. 
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Table 4: Comparisons of firms “operating in intensive competition environment” and other firms  
 
   Competition Firms Non-Competition Firms Difference Difference  
   Mean       
      
Median Mean Median Mean t-test Median Wilcoxon   
 Q 1.205 1.025 1.625 1.254 -0.420 0.004*** -0.229 0.000***  
 Sratio 0.061      
       
      
      
       
      
0.000 0.053 0.000 0.008 0.719 0.000 0.698  
 Stocksod 0.154 0.013 0.176 0.050 -0.023 0.529 -0.036 0.402  
 Blocko 0.292 0.228 0.267 0.161 0.025 0.564 0.068 0.299  
 Leverage 0.621 0.633 0.536 0.552 0.085 0.013** 0.081 0.008***  
 Outsider 0.870 0.866 0.888 0.888 -0.018 0.391 -0.021 0.546  
 Beta 1.005 0.992 0.722 0.650 0.283 0.002*** 0.342 0.007***  
 CEOP 0.192      
      
       
      
      
      
0.000 0.192 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.999  
 CSV 0.306 0.013 1.513 0.081 -1.207 0.075* -0.068 0.000***  
 Lnassets 13.577 13.409 13.700 13.494 -0.124 0.659 -0.085 0.539  
 Pgrowth 0.156 0.035 0.158 0.063 -0.003 0.970 -0.028 0.007***  
 ROA -0.023 0.017 0.071 0.073 -0.094 0.000*** -0.056 0.000***  
 Stdv 0.448 0.397 0.340 0.305 0.108 0.001*** 0.091 0.001***  
 
This table presents comparisons of mean and median Tobin’s Q (Q), ratio of share-based to cash compensation (Sratio), 
percentage of equity owned by officers and directors (Stocksod), cumulated voting rights by outside blockholders 
(Blocko), leverage (Leverage), the fraction of outside directors on the board (Outsider), log of book value of total assets 
(Lnassets), return on assets (ROA), average annual sales growth over the past three years (Pgrowth), change in 
shareholder value (CSV), standard deviation of stock returns (Stdv), market beta (Beta), and a dummy variable whether 
the CEO is also the president of the board (CEOP) between firms with a value of Rents equal to or above the median 
value (non-competition firms) and firms with a value of Rents below the median value (competition firms). Equality of 
means is tested using a standard t-test and equality of medians is tested using a Wilcoxon signed rank test. The table 
reports p-values. ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
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Table 5: Results from OLS regressions of Sratio on different measures of product 
market competition  
                             
 Dependent Variable = Sratio 
         (1)         (2)         (3)         (4)         (5)         (6)   
  C -0.095   -0.119   -0.111   -0.070   -0.280 * -0.097    
  0.408  0.462  0.635  0.062  0.740   
 Rents -0.065    -0.068  -0.143 *** -0.044   
  0.108   
 
 
0.518  
 0.106  0.001  0.274   
 Herf   0.006   -0.050  -0.176 ***  
   0.912   0.255  0.005  0.497   
-0.002
 Reg   -0.008  
0.092  
 
 -0.008  -0.043  0.030   
     0.686  0.689  0.137  0.359   
 Q 0.007  -0.002   0.008  0.005  0.006   
  0.525  0.840  0.835  0.504  0.829  0.678   
 Stocksod 0.008  0.029  0.032  0.018  0.046  0.015   
  0.792  0.427  0.453  0.541  0.306  0.742   
 Blocko -0.088 ** -0.092** -0.092** -0.085** -0.018  -0.130   
  0.033  0.031  0.029  0.037  0.645  0.154   
 Leverage -0.034  -0.020  -0.020  -0.033  0.038  0.031   
  0.526  0.733  0.728  0.542  0.579  0.760   
 Outsider 0.130 ** 0.127** 0.124** 0.121** 0.145 * 0.190   
  0.026  0.032  0.039  0.038  0.095  0.208   
 Lnassets 0.002  0.004  0.004  0.003  0.011  -0.005   
  0.808  0.697  0.662  0.784  0.397  0.667   
 CSV 0.014 ** 0.014** 0.014** 0.014** 0.027 *** 0.011   
  0.045  0.044  0.046  0.042  0.000  0.112   
 Stdv 0.083  0.102  0.103  0.086  0.021  -0.022   
  0.235  0.174  0.183  0.216  0.737  0.869   
 CEOP 0.070 ** 0.066* 0.064* 0.067** 0.090 * 0.102 **  
    0.026  0.060  0.085  0.038  0.061  0.039   
  Industry included   included   included   included   included   Included    
  Adjusted R2 0.318  0.204 0.204  0.313  0.487  0.279   
 F-statistic 3.026 *** 2.987 *** 2.993*** 2.531*** 8.294 *** 1.506   
 Prob(F-statistic) 0.002  0.002 0.002  0.005  0.000  0.149   
 
Durbin-Wu- 
Hausman 0.017  0.715 0.642 0.104
    
 
 Prob(D-W-H) 0.895  0.399 0.424 0.748      
  N 156   156  156  156  78   78    
 
Columns 1 to 4 report estimates from OLS regressions of the percentage of share-based to cash 
compensation (Sratio) on individual measures of product market competition (Rents, Herf, and Reg) 
and all three measures together along with Tobin’s Q (Q), four corporate governance mechanisms 
(Stocksod, Blocko, Leverage, and Outsider), and four control variables (Lnassets, CSV, Stdv, and 
CEOP). Columns 5 and 6 report OLS estimates for firms operating in a high and firms operating in 
a low competition environment. “Competition firms” (Column 5) are firms with a value of Rents 
below the median value and “non-competition firms” (Column 6) are firms with a value of Rents 
equal to or above the median value. An F-test is performed for the simultaneous significance of all 
coefficients (except the constant and industry dummies). The numbers in parentheses are 
probability values for two-sided tests. ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% 
level.  
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Table 6: Results from OLS regressions of Tobin’s Q on 
different measures of product market competition 
 
                      
  Dependent Variable = Tobin's Q 
            (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)     
 C 0.962  0.925  0.971  0.856   
  0.123  0.137  0.116  0.166   
 Rents 0.053    0.072   
  0.625    0.472   
 Herf  0.415   0.457   
   0.147   0.108   
 Reg   0.062  0.068   
    0.585  0.525   
 Sratio 0.292  0.189  0.222  0.323   
  0.348  0.437  0.390  0.283   
 Stocksod 0.517* 0.437  0.492* 0.429   
  0.053  0.104  0.064  0.107   
 Blocko -0.235  -0.246  -0.232  -0.244   
  0.221  0.195  0.223  0.206   
 Leverage 0.384  0.381  0.381  0.402   
  0.210  0.214  0.221  0.192   
 Outsider -0.248  -0.217  -0.262  -0.208   
  0.565  0.614  0.544  0.632   
 Lnassets 0.006  -0.003  0.000  -0.007   
  0.912  0.953  0.998  0.895   
 ROA 1.975** 2.257** 2.103** 2.170 **  
  0.036  0.012  0.016  0.026   
 Pgrowth 0.357  0.358  0.343  0.376   
  0.129  0.111  0.139  0.101   
 Beta 0.287** 0.315** 0.307** 0.292 **  
   0.048  0.029  0.031  0.050    
  Industry included   included   included   included     
 Adjusted R2 0.501   0.507   0.500   0.503    
 F-statistic 2.868  2.649  2.580  2.483   
 Prob(F-statistic) 0.003  0.006  0.007  0.006   
 
Durbin-Wu- 
Hausman 0.063 0.060 0.187 0.030 
 
 
  Prob(D-W-H) 0.802  0.808  0.666  0.863     
 
Estimates from OLS regressions of Tobin’s Q (Q) on individual measures 
of product market competition (Rents, Herf, and Reg) and all three 
measures together along with the percentage of share-based to cash 
compensation (Sratio), four corporate governance mechanisms (Stocksod, 
Blocko, Leverage, and Outsider), and four control variables (Lnassets, 
ROA, Pgrowth, and Beta). The sample size is 156. An F-test is performed 
for the simultaneous significance of all coefficients (except the constant 
and industry dummies). The numbers in parentheses are probability values 
for two-sided tests. ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 
1%/5%/10% level. 
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Table 7: Results from 3SLS estimations of the simultaneous 
equations system 
 
                      
  Panel A: Dependent Variable = Sratio 
    1  2  3  4     
 C -0.089  -0.108  -0.096  -0.064   
  0.517  0.478  0.527  0.646   
 Rents -0.065***     -0.067 ***  
  0.000      0.000   
 Herf   0.009    -0.049   
    0.868    0.332   
 Reg     -0.008  -0.008   
      0.745  0.722   
 Q 0.003  -0.037  -0.040  -0.002   
  0.920  0.278  0.261  0.942   
 Stocksod 0.010  0.045  0.050  0.023   
  0.834  0.386  0.335  0.629   
 Blocko -0.089** -0.104** -0.104** -0.089 **  
  0.034  0.024  0.023  0.035   
 Leverage -0.033  -0.017  -0.017  -0.032   
  0.560  0.787  0.788  0.580   
 Outsider 0.126  0.126  0.121  0.118   
  0.126  0.164  0.182  0.155   
 Lnassets 0.003  0.006  0.007  0.003   
  0.757  0.483  0.446  0.679   
 CSV 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.014 ***  
  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000   
 Stdv 0.086  0.108  0.110  0.090   
  0.178  0.122  0.115  0.159   
 CEOP 0.067** 0.066** 0.062** 0.064 **  
    0.013   0.024   0.039   0.019     
  Industry included  included  included  included     
 Wald test 87.732  43.900  41.224  89.176   
 Prob (Wald test) 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000   
 System-Hausman 0.098  0.328  0.223  0.007   
  Chi2  (10%) 6.251  (3)   6.251  (3)   6.251  (3)   6.251  (3)     
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  Panel B: Dependent Variable = Tobin's Q 
    1  2  3  4     
 C 1.017  0.988  1.078  0.887   
  0.142  0.163  0.131  0.197   
 Rents 0.066      0.082   
  0.502      0.405   
 Herf   0.409    0.460 *  
    0.140    0.099   
 Reg     0.074  0.072   
      0.575  0.576   
 Sratio 0.521  0.388  0.612  0.480   
  0.578  0.686  0.536  0.608   
 Stocksod 0.518** 0.436* 0.485** 0.427 *  
  0.032  0.074  0.048  0.082   
 Blocko -0.209  -0.222  -0.187  -0.227   
  0.388  0.368  0.455  0.344   
 Leverage 0.397  0.386  0.396  0.410   
  0.206  0.214  0.208  0.187   
 Outsider -0.250  -0.221  -0.269  -0.209   
  0.540  0.587  0.511  0.606   
 Lnassets -0.001  -0.009  -0.012  -0.011   
  0.990  0.843  0.803  0.803   
 ROA 2.002*** 2.278*** 2.164*** 2.182 ***  
  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000   
 Pgrowth 0.357*** 0.357*** 0.346*** 0.378 ***  
  0.003  0.002  0.003  0.002   
 Beta 0.288** 0.330*** 0.324*** 0.293 **  
    0.013   0.004   0.005   0.011     
  Industry included  included  included  included     
 Wald test 41.319  52.406  52.304  44.936   
 Prob (Wald test) 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000   
 System-Hausman 0.050  0.077  0.047  0.004   
  Chi2  (10%) 6.251  (3)   6.251  (3)   6.251  (3)   6.251  (3)     
 
Results from estimating equations 4.1 (Panel A) and 4.2 (Panel B) 
simultaneously by 3SLS. The sample size is 156. A Wald test is performed for 
the simultaneous significance of all coefficients (except the constant and 
industry dummies). The numbers in parentheses are probability values for two-
sided tests. To test for the correctness of the specification of the system of two 
simultaneous equations, a Hausman specification test is applied. The test 
statistic is distributed Chi-squared and we report the respective 10% critical 
values. ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
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Table 8: Robustness tests - OLS regressions of Sratio on different measures of product 
market competition 
 
                                 
  Dependent Variable = Sratio 
          (1)        (2)        (3)        (4)        (5)        (6)        (7)   
  C -0.070   -0.080   -0.074   -0.047   -0.080   -0.067   -0.024    
  0.635  0.380  0.617  0.762  0.586  0.653  0.884  
 Rents -0.068      -0.068  -0.066  -0.068  
  0.106      0.109  0.106  0.107  
 Rents_02   -0.059 ***       
    0.000        
 Rents8     -0.051       
      0.143       
 RentsL1      -0.053      
       0.152      
 Herf -0.050  -0.059  -0.044  -0.041     -0.051  
  0.255  0.129  0.324  0.357     0.244  
 Herf_02        -0.038     
        0.372     
 Herf_MaSe        -0.111   
         0.159   
 Reg -0.008  -0.007  -0.008  -0.007  -0.007  -0.008   
  0.689  0.726  0.694  0.735  0.739  0.708   
 Reg_General          -0.004  
           0.364  
 Q 0.008  0.006  0.007  0.007  0.007  0.006  0.008  
  0.504  0.523  0.547  0.526  0.526  0.584  0.485  
 Stocksod 0.018  0.007  0.018  0.017  0.016  0.023  0.021  
  0.541  0.792  0.543  0.555  0.578  0.494  0.487  
 Blocko -0.085 ** -0.084 ** -0.086** -0.085** -0.086** -0.093 ** -0.090** 
  0.037  0.048  0.036  0.036  0.038  0.026  0.029  
 Leverage -0.033  -0.011  -0.034  -0.037  -0.034  -0.021  -0.029  
  0.542  0.801  0.546  0.520  0.530  0.707  0.586  
 Outsider 0.121 ** 0.123 ** 0.118** 0.117** 0.123** 0.141 ** 0.116** 
  0.038  0.035  0.044  0.044  0.035  0.025  0.047  
 Lnassets 0.003  0.005  0.003  0.001  0.003  0.002  0.003  
  0.784  0.570  0.802  0.913  0.774  0.807  0.769  
 CSV 0.014 ** 0.013 * 0.014** 0.014** 0.014** 0.014 ** 0.014** 
  0.042  0.051  0.041  0.042  0.043  0.035  0.040  
 Stdv 0.086  0.062  0.101  0.083  0.085  0.075  0.086  
  0.216  0.368  0.157  0.240  0.221  0.284  0.215  
 CEOP 0.067 ** 0.075 ** 0.066** 0.067** 0.067** 0.071 ** 0.065** 
    0.038   0.013   0.043   0.040   0.036   0.028   0.041    
  Industry included   included   included   included   included   included   included    
  Adjusted R
2 0.318   0.412   0.299   0.293   0.311   0.318   0.315    
 F-statistic 3.026  4.067  2.505  2.561  2.537  2.614  2.529  
  Prob(F-stat) 0.002   0.000   0.005   0.004   0.005   0.004   0.005    
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This table reports estimates from OLS regressions of the percentage of share-based to cash 
compensation (Sratio) on alternative measures of product market competition (Rents, Rents_02, 
Rents8, RentsL1, Herf, Herf_02, Herf_MaSe, Reg, and Reg_General) and different combinations of 
three measures together (one measure of rents, one Herfindahl index, and one measure of the level of 
regulation) along with Tobin’s Q (Q), four corporate governance mechanisms (Stocksod, Blocko, 
Leverage, and Outsider), and four control variables (Lnassets, CSV, Stdv, and CEOP). The sample size 
is 156. An F-test is performed for the simultaneous significance of all coefficients (except the constant 
and industry dummies). The numbers in parentheses are probability values for two-sided tests. 
***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.  
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Table 9: Robustness tests - OLS regressions of Tobin’s Q on different measures of 
product market competition  
 
                                 
  Dependent Variable = Tobin's Q 
          (1)        (2)        (3)        (4)       (5)        (6)        (7)   
 C 0.856  0.899  0.842  0.810  0.918  0.961  0.639  
  0.166  0.149  0.175  0.194  0.140  0.123  0.336  
 Rents 0.072        0.067  0.050  0.074  
  0.472        0.509  0.650  0.458  
 Rents_02   -0.009            
    0.875            
 Rents8     0.061          
      0.409          
 RentsL1       0.079        
        0.266        
 Herf 0.457  0.414  0.458  0.465      0.458  
  0.108  0.150  0.106  0.100      0.102  
 Herf_02         0.345      
          0.219      
 Herf_MaSe           -0.230    
            0.476    
 Reg 0.068  0.069  0.068  0.066  0.056  0.059    
  0.525  0.516  0.524  0.535  0.613  0.603    
 Reg_General             0.020  
              0.336  
 Sratio 0.323  0.172  0.322  0.346  0.314  0.293  0.330  
  0.283  0.543  0.277  0.247  0.298  0.347  0.277  
 Stocksod 0.429  0.417  0.430  0.433  0.444* 0.529 * 0.420  
  0.107  0.115  0.105  0.103  0.095  0.054  0.118  
 Blocko -0.244  -0.245  -0.242  -0.245  -0.242  -0.243  -0.220  
  0.206  0.204  0.209  0.204  0.210  0.211  0.256  
 Leverage 0.402  0.390  0.403  0.415  0.406  0.411  0.382  
  0.192  0.216  0.190  0.177  0.190  0.192  0.209  
 Outsider -0.208  -0.227  -0.203  -0.202  -0.225  -0.231  -0.190  
  0.632  0.598  0.639  0.642  0.604  0.602  0.661  
 Lnassets -0.007  -0.007  -0.006  -0.005  -0.006  0.003  -0.006  
  0.895  0.888  0.908  0.929  0.914  0.955  0.906  
 ROA 2.170 ** 2.316 ** 2.180** 2.158** 2.145** 2.007 ** 2.146 ** 
  0.026  0.017  0.023  0.024  0.029  0.036  0.026  
 Pgrowth 0.376  0.356  0.377  0.379* 0.369  0.354  0.382 * 
  0.101  0.117  0.101  0.097  0.110  0.137  0.094  
 Beta 0.292 ** 0.320 ** 0.288* 0.291** 0.294** 0.284 * 0.286 * 
    0.050  0.030   0.056   0.046   0.049   0.053   0.054    
  Industry included   included  included  included  included  included   included    
 Adjusted R
2 0.503   0.500  0.503  0.505  0.499  0.495  0.504  
 F-statistic 2.483  2.313  2.509  2.609  2.451  2.384  2.594  
  Prob(F-stat) 0.006   0.010   0.005   0.004   0.006   0.008   0.004    
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This table reports estimates from OLS regressions of Tobin’s Q (Q) on alternative measures of product 
market competition (Rents, Rents_02, Rents8, RentsL1, Herf, Herf_02, Herf_MaSe, Reg, and 
Reg_General) and different combinations of three measures together (one measure of rents, one 
Herfindahl index, and one measure of the level of regulation) along with the percentage of share-based 
to cash compensation (Sratio), four corporate governance mechanisms (Stocksod, Blocko, Leverage, 
and Outsider), and four control variables (Lnassets, ROA, Pgrowth, and Beta). The sample size is 156. 
An F-test is performed for the simultaneous significance of all coefficients (except the constant and 
industry dummies). The numbers in parentheses are probability values for two-sided tests. ***/**/* 
denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.  
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